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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the survey period, the Fifth Circuit decided a number of
cases involving a variety of evidentiary issues. This article addresses
some of the more significant cases. Before addressing those decisions,
however, it is important to recognize the deference that the court
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usually gives to evidentiary rulings made by a trial court. Even
assuming that the trial court has erred in making an evidentiary
ruling, the court is not likely to reverse the decision. These points
were clearly articulated by Judge Rubin in Hardy v. Chemetron
Corp.:I
In reviewing these [evidentiary] rulings we recognize that a trial
court must make hundreds of evidentiary rulings in the course of
a trial and often must decide whether to admit or exclude evidence
almost instantaneously. No trial judge can be, or is expected to
be, infallible in making these decisions. The trial judge moreover
has the feel of the trial, sensing its tempo, the effect of evidence,
and the likely probative value of proffered testimony. Acknowledging both our respect for the local judge's superior knowledge
of the trial scene and the importance of enabling the trial judge
to keep the trial on course, we accord considerable deference ....2
Judge Rubin continued by noting that in assessing a litigant's claim
of error, the court applies two principles of law: First, error may
not be predicated on a ruling excluding or admitting evidence unless
it affects a substantial right of a party,3 and second, the court will
not overturn an evidentiary ruling and reverse the case or grant a
new trial unless the "ruling was so erroneous as to constitute an
4
abuse of discretion."

II.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR

It is axiomatic that in order to effectively assert on appeal that
the trial court made an erroneous evidentiary ruling, counsel must
have perfected the record at trial.' To perfect the record in the case
of the admission of evidence, counsel must have made a timely and
specific objection or motion to strike. 6 Where counsel hopes to argue
on appeal that the trial court erred in excluding evidence, counsel
must insure that the record indicates what the rejected evidence
would have shown. That is usually accomplished through an offer

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

870 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. Apr. 1989).
Id. at 1009.
Id.; see FED. R. EVD. 103(a).
870 F.2d at 1007.
See FED. R. EVD. 103(a).
Id.
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of proof.' One Fifth Circuit case, however, demonstrates that an
offer of proof may not be the only way to protect the record where
offered evidence is rejected.
In Garner v. Santoro,' a spray painter sued the manufacturer
of an epoxy paint for injuries he sustained while painting a Navy
ship under construction in a shipyard. 9 At trial, the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to assert the "Government Contractor Defense."' 0 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the court could not
consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to hear evidence
on that defense because the defendant had not made an offer of
proof on the defense" as required by Federal Rule of Evidence
103(a)(2).' 2 Noting that an offer of proof normally is required to
preserve a claim of error," 3 the court stated that "[a] specific offer
of evidence is not needed where an entire class of evidence has been
in advance formally declared inadmissible by the trial court during
preliminary argument or colloquy, for the court's ruling relates
forward to all possible offers of such evidence and renders them
needless.' ' 4 Here, the defendant had been precluded, by order of
the district court, from presenting the contractor defense. 5 That
order was later reaffirmed by a magistrate. 6 Accordingly, the court
ruled that the absence of an offer of proof under rule 103(a)(2) did
not preclude it from considering whether the trial court erred in
barring use of the defense.' 7 After considering the substantive law

7. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2).
8. 865 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. Jan. 1989).
9. Id. at 631.
10. Id. at 633. The elements of the defense are that
[Iliablity for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to
state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2)
the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to
the supplier but not to the United States. Id. at 635 (citing Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)).
11. Id. at 636.
12. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2) provides: "Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent
from the context within which questions were asked."
13. See Mills v. Levy, 537 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1976).
14.

865 F.2d at 636 (quoting 1 J. WIOMORF, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 17 (Tillers rev.

1983)(footnote omitted)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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and the facts in this case,18 the court concluded that the defendant
should have been permitted to present the defense, and remanded
the case to the trial court for further development of the contractor
defense.' 9 Interestingly, the court at several points noted the absence
of "facts" which would have enabled it to more fully analyze the
components of the contractor defense.20 An offer of proof spelling
out some of those facts might ultimately have assisted the court in
its analysis.
This case should not be read as a carte blanche justification for
not making an offer of proof. The court's decision is limited to
those situations where an entire class of evidence has been excluded
after some discussion by the parties. An offer of proof not only
provides the appellate courts with some information that they might
consider in evaluating whether the trial court erred in excluding
evidence, but it also provides the trial court with an opportunity to
reconsider its decision after counsel has set out on the record what
the evidence would have provided. 2 ' The fact that some form of
discussion or colloquy takes place during pretrial proceedings is some
assurance that both the trial and appellate courts have enough
information upon which they can decide whether a particular class
of evidence is admissible. Although an offer of proof might not be
required in this sort of case, it would seem wise to place information
on the record to show what the offered evidence would have been.
III.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Normally, counsel is required to prove formally the proposition
on which he or she is relying. 2 One of the classic exceptions to this
requirement of formal proof is judicial notice. 23 If counsel can
demonstrate that an offered fact is not reasonably in dispute, judicial
notice is usually appropriate. The notice is judicial in nature because
24
the court decides whether the fact is subject to reasonable dispute.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 642-44.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 636.
See E. CLEARY, MCCORWCK ON EVIDENCE § 51, at 123-24 (3d ed. 1984).

22.

See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANuAL 58 (4th ed.

1986).
23.
24.

Id.
See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE § 328, at 919-20 (3d ed. 1984).
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If the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute, judicial notice relieves

the jury from deciding whether the fact exists. 25 In a civil case, the
jury is bound by any fact which is judicially noticed; in a criminal
26
case, it is not.

The key inquiry in deciding whether to take judicial notice ' is
27
whether the fact to be noticed is "subject to reasonable dispute."

In making that determination the trial court is apparently given
discretion in both how it reaches that decision and what evidence it
considers in the process. 28
In Wooden v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,29 however, the
court indicated that whether another court has taken judicial notice
of the same facts is not necessarily dispositive. 30 The plaintiff filed
a suit against the defendant railroad under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 3 ' alleging that he had contracted silicosis3 2 by coming

into contact with substantial quantities of silica dust while working
with gravel placed under the railroad's tracks.33 In order to establish
that the railroad had previous notice of the dangers of exposure to
silica dust and that the railroad was thus negligent in not providing
him with a mask,3 4 the plaintiff asked the trial court to take judicial
notice that it was common knowledge in the 1950's that such dust
created a risk of silicosis. 35 He further argued that, under the rea-

25. Id.
26. See FED. R. EvID. 201(g) which states: "Instructing jury. In a civil action or
proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed."
27. See FED. R. Evm. 201(b) which states:
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
28. Rule 201 is silent as to the particulars of how the parties are to present the necessary
information to the court to justify judicial notice of adjudicative facts. Given the fact that
the rules of evidence generally do not apply to preliminary matters, a judge should be able to
consider virtually any type of evidence that is not privileged information. See FED. R. EvID.
104(a); see also FED. R. EvrD. 501 (general rule for determining what is privileged information).
29. 862 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. Jan. 1989).
30. Id. at 563.
31. 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1982).
32. 862 F.2d at 561. Silicosis is a lung disease associated with silica dusts. Id.
33. Id. He had operated a tamping machine, which was powered by compressed air to
pack the gravel under the railroad tracks between the years 1954 to 1961. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 563.
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soning of the 1944 New York Court of Appeals case of Sadowski v.
Long Island Railroad Co.,36 this fact was not subject to reasonable
dispute.3 7 The trial court declined to take judicial notice.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the proffered fact
was not suitable for judicial notice. 8 In holding that the trial court
had not erred in its ruling,3 9 the court cited its earlier decision in
Hardy v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp.,4 where it stated:
[Jiudicial notice applies to self-evident truths that no reasonable
person could question, truisms that approach platitudes or banalities. The proposition that asbestos causes cancer, because it is
inextricably linked to a host of disputed issues, .

.

. is not at

present so self-evident a proposition as to be subject to judicial
41

notice.

According to the court, the plaintiff in this case had attempted to
link his proffered fact - that it was common knowledge that inhaling
silica dust could lead to lung disease - with the controverted issue
of whether the defendant in this case knew that the "particular
concentration of dust to which [the plaintiff] was exposed entailed a
significant risk of silicosis.

' ' 42

The court noted that to take judicial

notice that some amounts of silica dust were known to cause injury
would only have confused the jury in deciding whether the defendant
4
knew, or should have known, that a particular amount was harmful.

3

The court added that the plaintiff had misused precedent by attempting to argue that dicta, even in Supreme Court decisions, could
dispose of factual issues in later cases." However, the fact that
silicosis lawsuits existed in the 1950's, said the court, could be offered

36. 292 N.Y. 448, 456, 55 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1944) where the court stated that "[it is a
matter of common knowledge that it is injurious to the lungs and dangerous to health to work
in silica dust, a fact which defendant was bound to know." Id. A similar observation has
been made by the United States Supreme Court. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180
(1949).
37. 862 F.2d at 563; see FED. R. EvD. 201.
38. 862 F.2d at 563.
39. Id.
40. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
41. Id. at 347-48.
42. 862 F.2d at 563.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 563-64. The court noted that "the Supreme Court is an authoritative source of
federal law, but it is not authoritative on factual questions about industrial knowledge of
occupational diseases in the 1950's." Id.
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into evidence to support the inference that railroads knew about the
45
dangers of silicosis.

IV.

RELEVANCY ISSUES

At a minimum, evidence offered by counsel must meet the
relevancy threshold. That is, the proponent of evidence must demonstrate that the evidence tends to make the existence of a fact more
probable, or less probable. 6 This hurdle is sometimes referred to as
the requirement of "logical relevance." ' 47 But that is only the first
hurdle. Counsel and the court must also be prepared to address the
issue of whether there are intrinsic or extrinsic policy reasons for
declaring the evidence inadmissible even though it is relevant. Perhaps
the clearest example of this doctrine, which is sometimes referred to
as "legal relevance, ' 48 is reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 403
which requires the trial judge to balance the probative value of the
offered, relevant evidence against probative dangers such as confusion
of issues or cumulativeness. 49 Other examples of this exclusionary
rule include rule 404 which normally excludes character evidence,50
rule 407 which blocks admission of subsequent remedial measures,"
and rule 411 which generally excludes admission of the existence of
52
liability insurance.
A.

"Other Acts" Evidence: Similar Incidents in Products Liability
Cases

The federal courts have typically permitted a plaintiff in a
negligence case to introduce similar acts of the defendant on the
theory that such acts put the defendant on notice that a dangerous
condition existed. 3 Two issues usually arise in conjunction with such
evidence: the degree of similarity between the prior incident(s) and

45. Id. at 564.
46. See FED.. R. EVID. 401 (setting out the definition of relevant evidence).
47. See generally E. CLEARY, MCCORMCK oN EVIDENCE § 185, at 542 (3d ed. 1984)(using
the term).
48. See generally id. at 548 (citing cases but concluding that the term may be misleading).
49. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
50. See FED. R. EvrD. 404(a).
51. See FED. R. EvmD. 407.
52. See FED. R. EViD. 411.
53.

See, e.g.,E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 200, at 587 (3d ed. 1984).
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the incident at issue, and the number of incidents involved.14 The

greater the similarity and number of incidents, the greater the inference that the defendant knew of the dangerous condition. 5
In McGonical v. Gerhart Industries, Inc. ,S6 the plaintiffs were

military service members who were injured when a hand grenade,7

manufactured and tested by the defendants, prematurely exploded.1
The plaintiffs proceeded on a negligence theory, 8 arguing that the
defendants had improperly conducted the so-called "100% x-ray"
procedure which was supposed to detect faulty delay fuses to be
installed in hand grenades. 9 The plaintiffs introduced evidence of
two other defective time delay fuses which had been tested by the
"100% x-ray" procedure. 60 One had been tested by the defendant;
the other had not. 6' The plaintiffs also introduced evidence of two
other premature detonations which had passed the same testing
procedure used by other manufacturers.6 2 In short, of the four earlier
incidents involving defective fuses, only one directly implicated the

defendant .63
Noting that it had relaxed the requirement of similarity in
permitting introduction of other accidents in Jackson v. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co.,64 the court stated that any differences in the

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 851 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. Aug. 1988). An earlier directed verdict in favor of one
of the defendants had been remanded by the court for a new trial. McGonigal v. Gerhart
Indus., 788 F.2d 321, 328 (5th Cir. 1986).
57. 851 F.2d at 776. The defective fuses in the grenades which caused the accident had
been manufactured by Gerhart Industries which later settled the case. The remaining defendant,
Day and Zimmerman, had assembled the grenades. The accident occurred as the service
members were involved in hand grenade requalification training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Id.
58. Id. Although the plaintiffs had initially filed a cause of action based upon both strict
liability and negligence theories, they later proceeded solely on a theory of negligence. Id.
59. Id. at 777. The term "1000o x-ray" procedure was used by the parties to describe
the procedure for testing each grenade fuse and eliminating every one which was defective.
Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The usual time delay fuse lasts approximately five seconds. The fuse tested by the
defendants had a delay of only 2.47 seconds. Id.
62. Id. at 777-78. These premature detonations had occurred at Fort Jackson and Quantico
Marine Base. Id.
63. Id.
64. 788 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1986).
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occurrences affect only the weight to be given to the evidence., In
this case, the court concluded, evidence that another grenade tested
and assembled by the defendant had prematurely exploded was
"reasonably probative" of the plaintiff's argument that the defendant
was negligent in approving defective fuses. 6 Conversely, evidence of
the other three defective grenade fuses was not admissible because
the plaintiff had not challenged the testing procedure itself, but
instead the manner in which the defendant used it.67 The negligence
of other contractors "had no tendency to prove negligence on the
part of [the defendant].

' 68

The introduction of the three unrelated

incidents was harmless error, however, because the jury was aware
that only one of the incidents involved a fuse tested by the defen-

dant .69
It is difficult to quarrel with the result in this case. The relaxed
standard for admissibility of similar incidents in negligence cases is
generally in harmony with the low threshold of relevancy articulated
in Federal Rule of Evidence 401 which requires only that the proffered
70
evidence have "any tendency" to prove or disprove a fact in issue.
Where a defendant is using a procedure designed to remove all
defective fuses, evidence of even a solitary incident has some tendency, however slight, to show that the defendant was aware of a
dangerous condition.
B.

"Other Acts" Evidence: Uncharged Misconduct in Criminal
Cases

As a general rule the prosecution may not introduce evidence of
other crimes or acts committed by the defendant in an attempt to
show that he has a bad character. 71 It may, however, introduce such
evidence if it can establish that the evidence is relevant for other
purposes. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that:

65. 851 F.2d at 778 (citing Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1083
(5th Cir. 1986)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See FED. R. EvID. 401.
71. See id. at 404(b). Cf. id. at 405(b)(specific instances of conduct admissible where
character is an essential element of a claim or a defense).
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci72
dent.
It should come as no surprise that rule 404(b) is one of the most
litigated of the Federal Rules of Evidence, given the fact that in
most criminal cases, the prosecution can almost always locate some
act or incident in the defendant's past which would be admissible
73
under rule 404(b).
For example, in United States v. Tullos,7 4 the defendants were
charged with various improprieties in loan transactions with a federally insured bank. 75 One of the defendants, an attorney for the
bank, testified that he had never knowingly filed false reports with
the bank. 76 In rebuttal, the prosecution offered evidence that on
several prior, unrelated occasions the defendant had filed bills for
his services with the bank which did not comport with the version
of the bills he prepared for his law firm's records.7 7 The defendant
unsuccessfully argued that the evidence was introduced only to show
that he was cheating his law partners, that he was a bad person, and
that he was probably involved with the other defendant's criminal
7
activity.
On appeal, the court stated that the evidence of the other
misconduct could be properly used to rebut the defendant's good
faith defense. 79 That defense, according to the court, placed the
defendant's intent in issue and the offered incidents of misconduct
were admissible to dispel his contention of mistake. 0

72. See id. at 404(b).
73. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 125 (3d ed.
1982).
74. 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. Mar. 1989).
75. Id. at 690-93. The defendants were indicted for, inter alia, numerous counts of making
false entries in reports filed with the bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1006, willful
misapplication of the bank's funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 657, and conspiracy to make
false entries and misapply funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id.
76. Id. at 697.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The court noted that an "appropriate" limiting instruction had
been given to the jury"1 and that although this evidence was "obviously prejudicial," the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
82
concluding that the probative value outweighed that prejudice.
C. Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures
In order to encourage employers and manufacturers to improve
safety, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of "subsequent remedial measures. ' 83 The rule
recognizes that if the jury hears that a defendant has fixed the defect
that caused an accident, it is likely to assume that the defendant, by
making the repairs, has admitted fault. But rule 407 is not an absolute
exclusionary rule. Although the proponent cannot introduce evidence
of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or culpable
conduct, such evidence may be used for such purposes as proving
"ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if

84
controverted, or impeachment."

In Hardy v. Chemetron Corp. 5 the court squarely addressed the
applicability of rule 407. In that case, the plaintiff lost the tips of
two fingers while operating a bacon-slicing machine manufactured
by the defendant.8 6 The focus of the litigation centered on whether
the machine had been properly wired.8 7 The plaintiff attempted to
offer evidence that shortly after the accident, the defendant had
rewired its slicers.88 The trial court ruled that the evidence of the
defendant's subsequent remedial measure was inadmissible and the
jury ultimately returned with a verdict favorable to the defendant
manufacturer.89

81.

Id. See FED. R. EvD. 105. The value of limiting instructions on the limited admissibility

of rule 404(b) evidence was discussed in Schlueter, Evidence, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 20
TEx. TECH L. REV. 427, 435-37 (1989) (discussing United States v. Chase, 838 F.2d 743 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied,
82.

-. U.S.

__

, 108 S. Ct. 2022, 100 L. Ed.2d 609 (1988)).

868 F.2d at 697. The court summarily rejected the argument that the other defendants

had been prejudiced by this evidence. Id. See also FED. R. EvrD. 403 (requiring court to
balance probative value against prejudice).
83. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
84.
85.

FED. R. EVID. 407.
870 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. Apr. 1989).

86.
87.

Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1010.

88.

Id.

89.

Id.at 1008.
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On appeal the plaintiff argued that the evidence was admissible
to (1) impeach the defendant's position at trial that the wiring was
not the cause of the injury; 90 (2) to impeach the defendant's assertion
that the machine worked properly after the accident; 9' (3) to rebut
testimony that rewiring the machine was impractical; 92 and (4) to
rebut testimony that the design change would not have prevented the
accident. 93 The court rejected all four arguments. 94
As to the first argument, the court indicated that to permit the
plaintiff to rebut the defendant's "trial position" that the wiring was
not at fault would in effect permit her to argue that the subsequent
change proved the defendant's negligence. 9 That, said the court, is
exactly what rule 407 was designed to preclude and labeling the
evidence as impeachment is "semantic manipulation. '" 96 The court
cited the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Public Service Co. of Indiana
v. Bath Iron Works Corp.:9
[The impeachment] exception must be applied with care, since
"any evidence of subsequent remedial measures might be thought
to contradict and so in a sense impeach [a party's] testimony that
he was using due care at the time of the accident ....
(1If this
counted as 'impeachment' the exception would swallow the rule." 98
The court emphasized that its earlier decision in Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co.9 did not support the plaintiff's position. °0 In Muzyka,
subsequent remedial measures were admitted for impeachment but
the court noted that in that case the defendants had testified in
''superlatives" that the product was safe and of superior quality.' 0
In this case, said the court, the defendant's testimony contained no
such superlatives and could not have mislead the jury. 0 2

90. Id. at 1010-11.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1011-12. The court noted that this argument had not been raised in the
plaintiff's appellate brief but had been raised at oral argument. Id.
93. Id. This argument was also raised at oral argument. Id.
94. Id. at 1010-12.
95. Id. at 1010-11.
96. Id. at 1011.
97. 773 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1985).
98. 870 F.2d at 1010-11 (quoting Public Serv. Co. of Ind. v. Bath Iron Works Corp.,
773 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1985)).
99. 774 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1985).
100. 870 F.2d at 1011.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court noted that the defendant had conceded that rewiring was feasible. Id.
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With regard to the second argument, that the evidence was
admissible to impeach testimony that the machine had functioned
properly after the accident, the court concluded that the facts did
not support the argument since the testimony offered by the defense
only indicated that the machine had operated without incident after
the accident, but only the same day as the accident. 03 The defendant
made no claim regarding the subsequent functioning of the machine.' ° Thus, there were no misleading claims by the defense which
would have permitted evidence of the subsequent repairs. 0 5
The court also rejected the plaintiff's third argument that the
evidence was admissible to rebut the defense testimony that a design
advocated by the plaintiff was impractical. °6 The court noted that
the defense witnesses had not so testified. 0 7 Instead, they had indicated that the original wiring was "more practical."'0 8
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the evidence should
have been admitted to rebut testimony that the "design change would
not have prevented the accident." °9 On this point, the court simply
concluded that the fact that remedial steps were taken "in no way
demonstrates whether the change would or would not have prevented
the accident."" 0
Judge Garza registered a lengthy and thoughtful dissent."' He
noted that the defense had repeatedly opened the door for impeachment evidence and then relied upon rule 407 to prevent the plaintiff
from responding." 2 If the defendant wished to block evidence concerning its subsequent remedial measure, then it should have refrained
from presenting evidence that no such remedial measure had been
taken." 3 In concluding that the plaintiff had not received a fair
trial," 4 Judge Garza stated:

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1011-12.

1012.
1012-16 (Garza,
1015 (Garza, J.,
1014 (Garza, J.,
1015 (Garza, J.,

J., dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
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The impeachment exception to Rule 407 is not surplusage; it was
drafted for a reason. If, as the majority holds today, the case at
bar does not fall within the exception, it is difficult to imagine
one that would. I do not believe that Rule 407 permits a defendant
who has effected subsequent design changes to make statements
which repeatedly imply that no subsequent remedial measures were
taken, or that no practical manufacturer would consider taking
such measures, or that such changes would, in any event, simply
not work. In three different ways, and on at least three different
occasions during trial, Chemetron's expert laid these inferences
before the jury and then hid within the shelter of Rule 407 .... 15
Judge Garza's dissent is persuasive. Although it is always difficult,
as the majority recognizes, to second guess the trial court, the
majority's view that its decision in Muzyka was distinguishable is
questionable. That position seems to send the signal that rule 407's
impeachment exception is only available when the defendant exaggerates about the fine features of its product. Certainly, exaggerations
and superlatives make it easier for both trial and appellate courts to
conclude that remedial measures should be admitted for impeachment. But the lack of superlatives should not preclude that evidence
if the defense has been subtle enough to send the same signal to the
jury in more humble tones.
D.

Evidence of Liability Insurance

Like rule 407, rule 411 reflects particular policy reasons for
excluding evidence of liability insurance." 6 Rule 411 provides a
general rule of exclusion followed by several exceptions. One of the
stated exceptions is to permit evidence of insurance for impeachment
purposes.
In Granberry v. O'Barr,"7 the plaintiff's father was killed when
a semi-trailer truck owned by the defendant collided with his pickup
truck."' The only non-participant eyewitness testified on behalf of
the defendant." 9 On cross-examination the plaintiff attempted to
question the eyewitness on the fact that he was employed by a life
insurance company which was under the "umbrella" of the same

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
See
866
Id.
Id.

(Garza, J., dissenting).
FED. R. Evm. 411 advisory committee's note.
F.2d 112 (5th Cir. Dec. 1988).
at 113.
at 113-14.
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insurance company that carried liability insurance on the defendant's
truck 120 The trial court carefully explored the issue of the corporate
structure of the insurance company and the witness' exact relationship
to the company' 21 and blocked the plaintiff's attempt to cross-examine
the witness about that relationship.'22
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the trial court had not abused
its discretion in excluding the evidence. 23 Particularly relevant, said
the court, was the fact that the testimony of the witness was entirely
consistent with several statements made at the time of the accident
to the driver of the semi-truck and to a policeman. 124 Further, there
was no evidence to indicate that he was aware that the owner of the
truck was insured, let alone that he was insured by the witness'
25
employer.
This case is a difficult one. Rule 411 recognizes that evidence
that a party is insured generally may mislead the jury into a particular
result under a "deep pocket" theory. 26 But the rule also recognizes
that there are other independent reasons for admitting such evidence. 2 7 This case seems to fall clearly within those exceptions. The
witness in question was apparently a key witness for the defense and
as a "non-participant" to the accident itself, must certainly have
been perceived by the jury as an uninterested party. But at the time
of trial, the witness was employed as an executive for the insurance
company which carried the liability insurance on the defendant's
truck. 28 This seems to be the classic case of using the witness'
relationship to a party to show "bias,"' ' 29 which the Supreme Court

120. Id. at 114.
121. Id. Apparently, the witness had earlier been an agent for the parent company and at
the time of the trial was an executive with the company which was the defendant's liability
insurer. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See FED. R. EvID. 411 advisory committee's note.
127. See FED. R. EvlD. 411.
128. 866 F.2d at 114.
129. The topic of bias is not specifically mentioned in the Federal Rules of Evidence but
is nonetheless recognized as a valid means of impeaching a witness. State codifications of the
Federal Rules of Evidence have included specific provision for impeachment by showing bias.
See, e.g.,
TEX. R. Crv. Evm. 613(b); TEx. R. CraM. Evw. 612(b). See generally H. WENDORF
& D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 247-49 (2d ed. 1988)(discussing impeachment by bias).
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has indicated is important enough to carry constitutional implications,
at least in criminal cases.130 The court places much emphasis on the
fact that the witness' testimony was consistent with statements made
at the time of the accident and from that, apparently concludes that
his relationship with the insurance company was not an important
factor. 3 ' But that determination should have been made by the jury
32
in assessing the credibility of the witness.
V.

COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES: THE MENTAL PROCESSES RULE

Federal Rule of Evidence 601 assumes that all witnesses are
competent to testify about relevant matters. 33 The rule also recognizes
that certain categories of individuals may be considered incompetent
to testify under applicable state law. 34 Other rules in Article VI of
the Federal Rules of Evidence specify that certain individuals may
not testify about certain matters. 135 For example, rule 606 generally
disqualifies jurors from testifying about what was said or done during
deliberations; 3 6 rule 605 declares that a judge may not testify at a
37
trial over which he is presiding.
Although it is not specifically mentioned in the Federal Rules
of Evidence, the courts have recognized a "mental processes" rule
which, like rule 607, exempts quasi-judicial officials from providing
compulsory testimony. The Fifth Circuit addressed the applicability
of this rule in Gary W. v. Louisiana Department of Health and
38
Human Resources.
In that case, a district court in 1978 appointed a special master'3 9
to ensure compliance with a protective order by the court addressing

130. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-18 (1974).
131. See 866 F.2d at 114.
132. See FED. R. EvlD. 104(e)Uury to decide weight and credibility of evidence).
133. FED. R. EviD. 601 states:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency
of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.
134. Id.
135. See FED. R. EvlD. 601-614.
136. See FED. R. EvtD. 606.
137. See FED. R. Evm. 605.
138. 861 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. Dec. 1988).
139. Id. at 1367; see also FED. R. Crw. P. 53(e) (governing the appointment of masters).
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the rights of mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed children. 140
In 1979, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the appointment 14' and noted that
the master would serve the roles of fact-finder, hearing officer, and
monitor. 142 In 1987, the master issued a formal recommendation and
in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53,143 a hearing
was scheduled before a magistrate to determine whether the report
should be adopted.'"4 In preparation for the hearing, the special
master prepared a report to substantiate her recommendations. 45 The
State, in an attempt to review that report, noticed the master's
1
deposition and issued her a subpoena and a subpoena duces tecum.
The magistrate quashed the subpoenas and the district court af47
firmed. 1
In affirming the district court's ruling that the special master
' 4l
could not be deposed, the court cited the "mental processes rule.'
The court noted that the rule was recognized by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Morgan149 where it concluded that the Secretary
of Agriculture should not have been subjected to a deposition and
trial testimony on the issue of how certain rates had been established.5 0 In reaching its conclusion the Supreme Court stated in part:
[T]he Secretary should never have been subjected to this examination. The proceeding before the Secretary "has a quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding." Such an examination of a
judge would be destructive of judicial responsibility. We have
explicitly held in this very litigation that "it was not the function
of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary." Just
as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny, so the integrity
of the administrative process must be equally respected.' 5'
The court also cited its own opinion in Bank of Commerce of Laredo
v. City National Bank of Laredo,5 2 where it had blocked the testi-

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

861 F.2d at 1367.
Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id.
FED. R. Cwv. P. 53(e).
861 F.2d at 1367.
Id.at 1368.
Id.
Id.
Id.
313 U.S. 409 (1941).
Id.at 421-22.
Id. at 422.
484 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
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mony of the Comptroller of the Currency.'53 The court noted that
although in both of these cases, the mental processes rule had been
applied to agency officials, the rule had also been applied to judicial
and quasi-judicial officials. 5 4 In this case, said the court, the special
master had performed a quasi-judicial role in fulfilling her duties as
a master and it would have been inappropriate to examine her mental
processes.' 55
This decision is sound and tracks the more formalized rule that
judges should normally not testify. 5 6 Although it is not clear from
the decision itself, presumably the "mental processes rule" is not an
absolute bar and under appropriate circumstances, a judicial or quasijudicial official could be required to testify. The court implied as
much when it cited language from United States v. Dowdy, 5 7 to the
effect that the rule would apply absent "extreme and extraordinary
8

circumstances."15

VI.

OPINION TESTIMONY

As a general rule, courts prefer to hear "facts" based upon a
witness' personal knowledge. Article VII of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, however, recognizes that both lay and opinion testimony
may be helpful to the fact-finder and specifically address the admissibility of both brands of opinion testimony.15 9 During the survey
period the court addressed a variety of issues generally falling under
the topic of "opinion" testimony.
A.

Lay Opinion Testimony

Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits introduction of lay opinion
testimony if (1) it is "rationally based on the perception of the

153. Id. at 287.
154. 861 F.2d at 1369 (citing United States v. Dowdy, 440 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Va. 1977)).
155. Id. The court recognized that at the time she prepared her report to be submitted to
the magistrate, she was no longer the special master. Nonetheless, the report was prepared to
support her recommendations and the State sought to depose her on the findings she had
entered as a master. Id. at n.5.
156. FED. R. Evmo. 607.
157. United States v. Dowdy, 440 F. Supp. 894, 896 (W.D. Va. 1977).
158. 861 F.2d at 1369; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) (indicating that the rule would not apply where there was strong showing of bad faith
or improper behavior).
159. See FED. R. Evm. 701-706.
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witness" and (2) it is "helpful to the determination of a fact in
issue.' 160 This two-pronged requirement is usually easily met and on
appellate review of the issue, the federal courts will reverse only for
161
an abuse of discretion.
The court addressed the issue of lay opinion testimony in Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co. ,162 and Peteet v. Dow
Chemical Co.16 In Hansard, the 59-year-old plaintiff brought action
against his former employer arguing that he had been discharged in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 164 At trial,
the plaintiff relied on the opinion testimony of a supervisor employed
by the defendant 165 to the effect that the plaintiff had been relieved,
and not rehired, as part of the defendant's "youth movement."' 1
Noting that courts often permit lay witnesses to express an opinion
on the intent or motivation of a particular person, 167 the court
concluded that the witness in this case had some basis for expressing
an opinion on the defendant's motivation for discharging the plaintiff. 16 The court admitted that the witness' testimony was not "strongly
supported" but that it was based upon his own experience in the
defendant corporation, and not the hearsay statements of another
69
person. 1
In Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 170 the plaintiff had worked for
the United States Forest Service for two years as a seasonal employee.' 7 ' His primary duties were those of a firefighter but he

160. FED. R. Evw. 701.
161. See, e.g., Scheib v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 628 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
__,
110 S. Ct. 129, -.L.
162. 865 F.2d 1461 (5th Cir. Feb.), cert. denied, -U.S.
-(1989).
Ed. 2d
L.
, 10 S. Ct. 328,
163. 868 F.2d 1428 (5th Cir. Apr.), cert. denied, -U.S.
Ed. 2d
-(1989).
164. 865 F.2d at 1464-66; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
165. 865 F.2d at 1464. The witness, Mr. Charles Miller, was a warehouse manager for the
defendant. Id.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 585 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1978)
(permitting the plaintiff's daughter to testify that her father did not believe that his wife would
shoot him).
168. 865 F.2d at 1466-67.
169. Id. at 1467. Cf. Mitroff v. Xomox Corp., 797 F.2d 271, 275-76 (6th Cir. 1986)(finding
no basis for lay opinion testimony).
, 110 S. Ct. 328,
-L.
170. 868 F.2d 1428 (5th Cir. Apr.), cert. denied, -U.S. __
Ed. 2d
-(1989).
171. Id. at 1430.
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sometimes participated in a weed control project called "hack and
squirt.' 1 72 The program required him to use a herbicide containing
a chemical manufactured by the defendant chemical company.17 Two
years later he was diagnosed as having Hodgkin's disease; he eventually died from that disease but not before he had filed an action
174
against the defendant.
At trial the plaintiffs relied on both expert testimony of a
toxologist and lay opinion testimony from two former employees of
the United States Forest Service to show that the cause of death was
directly related to exposure to the defendant's herbicide.' 75 One of
the the two former employees testified that although he had never
actually participated in the "hack and squirt" operations, he had
seen other workers frequently get the herbicide on their clothes and
skin. 176 The other employee testified that he had taken part in the
weed control program where workers were exposed to the fumes and
77
that he and other workers had been splashed with the herbicide.'
The defense argued that this testimony was irrelevant and that
neither employee had actually seen the plaintiff conducting the "hack
and squirt" operations. 17 Concluding that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in admitting this lay opinion testimony, the
court simply, and correctly, stated that the testimony of both em79
ployees was founded upon their own knowledge and observations.
B.

Expert Opinion: Qualifications of Experts

Typically the federal courts are generous in interpreting the
application of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 which states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

172.
173.
174.
parties.
175.
portion
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id. After the plaintiff-worker died, his wife, children and parents were substituted as
Id. at n.1.
Id. at 1430, 1434-35. See infra notes 182-211 and accompanying text (discussing the
of the court's opinion addressing the admissibility of the expert opinion testimony).
868 F.2d at 1434.
Id. at 1434-35.
Id. at 1435.
Id.
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experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise. 8 0
In applying this rule, the courts will generally provide great leeway
to trial courts in deciding whether a particular witness qualified as
an "expert" and will reverse only if a trial court's ruling was

manifestly erroneous.' 8
In Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co.,182 a toxologist testified that in
his expert opinion the defendant's herbicide had caused the death of
one of the plaintiffs.183 There seemed to be no doubt that the witness
had substantial qualifications: he was a medical doctor and a certified
toxologist; he had various academic appointments and had consulted
with several companies on handling toxic products; he had published
thirty-eight or thirty-nine articles on the subject; and he had extensive
experience in determining whether an environmental or occupational
development had caused cancer. 8" The defendant complained, however, that the witness was not qualified to render an opinion because
he was not a "specialist in any particular field."'8 5 The court rejected
that argument and cited extensive authority for the proposition that
the fact that a witness is not a specialist goes only to the weight,
8 6
and not to the admissibility, of the opinion testimony.
C.

Expert Opinion: The Requirement of a Basis

Assuming that a particular witness is an "expert" within the
broad terms of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the proponent of the
expert testimony must demonstrate that there is some basis for the
opinion. 8 7 Federal Rule of Evidence 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming

See FED. R. EvrD. 702; see also S. SALTZBURG AND K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF
MANUAL 638-39 (4th ed. 1986) and Supp. 159-60 (1989)(collection of cases).
181. See Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 721 (5th Cir. 1986);
Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 734 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1984).
182. 868 F.2d at 1428.
183. Id. at 1430-31.
184. Id. at 1431.
185. Id.
186. Id. See also Hermes v. Pfizer, Inc., 848 F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir. Jun. 1988) ("There is
nothing that generally disqualifies a non-physician as an expert on causation").
187. See FED. R. EvD. 702.
180.
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opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.'
89
The application of this rule was discussed in detail in Peteet.
The plaintiffs in Peteet relied heavily upon the expert testimony
of a toxicologist that the defendant's herbicide had caused the death
of one of the plaintiffs.' 9° The defense challenged the "basis" of the
expert's opinion on several grounds.' 9' First, the defendant argued
that the expert never "personally examined" the deceased. 92 Citing
opinions from other circuits' 93 and noting that rule 703 reduces the
need for firsthand knowledge, 194 the court stated that a personal
examination is not required. 95
The defendant also argued that the toxologist's expert opinion
should have been disallowed because he had relied upon information
provided by plaintiff's counsel.196 The court summarily rejected this
argument noting that "[a] different result would infuse many personal
' 97
injury suits with quite difficult issues of source tracing."'
The plaintiff's expert also relied upon information he had obtained from scientific literature which had been published after the
plaintiff had been exposed to the defendant's herbicide. 98 The court
rejected the defense's argument that the opinion should thus have
been excluded.199 First, the defendant had waived that particular
argument," and second, the articles were admissible on the issue of
causation. 20'
The defendant also argued that some of the scientific literature
upon which the expert relied was "wholly irrelevant" to injuries not

188. See FED. R. EvrD. 703.
189. See supra notes 170-79, 182-86 and accompanying text.
190. 862 F.2d at 1431.
191. Id. at 1432.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing Sweet v. United States, 687 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1982)); Data Line
Corp. v. Micro Tech., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
194. Id. (citing 3 D. LOUtSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 389, at 657 (1979)).
195. 868 F.2d at 1432.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1135 (5th Cir.

1985).
198. 868 F.2d at 1432-33.
199. Id. at 1433.
200. Id. See FED. R. Ev-m. 103(a).
201. 868 F.2d at 1433. Cf. Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 79 (5th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (subsequent study following accident was
admissible on issue of defectiveness).
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involved in the case. 20 2 The court agreed on this issue but determined
that any error was harmless because it did not substantially prejudice
the defendant. 203
Finally, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's expert improperly relied upon a study conducted by the defendant to express his
opinion that the defendant's herbicide contained impurities and that
the defendant was in violation of various Environmental Protection
Act provisions. 2° The court noted that the expert could properly rely
upon a study in formulating his opinion 20 5 With regard to his
testimony that the defendant had violated the law, however, the court
concluded that the admission of that portion of his opinion was
2
harmless error. 06
The Peteet decision is a good case study on the variety of
information which may serve as a legitimate source for an expert's
opinion. Further, the court's disposition of the case seems to be
entirely consistent with the breadth of rule 703 which recognizes that
which is reliable and
an expert may rely on virtually any information
20 7
reasonably related to a fact in issue.
D. Expert Opinion: The Maverick Opinion
One final point on expert testimony in Peteet deserves attention.
The plaintiff's toxologist testified that in his opinion "one molecule
of carcinogen, in the right place and at the right time, can cause
cancer." 208 The defendant argued on appeal that this "one-hit" theory
was "specious. ' ' 20 9 Noting that the defendant had waived the issue,
the court nonetheless suggested that the absence of a consensus on
a scientific theory did not render it inadmissible:
An expert's opinion need not be generally accepted in the scientific
community before it can be sufficiently reliable and probative to

202. 868 F.2d at 1433.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1434.
205. Id.
206. Id. The court noted that the testimony was beyond the witness' expertise. Id.
207. See also Hermes v. Pfizer, Inc., 848 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. Jun. 1988) (noting that expert's
opinion was supported by another doctor's testimony that his mother had exhibited the same
symptoms as those experienced by the plaintiff). Cf. Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d
420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[the] lack of reliable support may render [the opinion] more
prejudicial than probative, [thus] making it inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403").
208. 868 F.2d at 1433.
209. Id.
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support a jury finding. . . .What is necessary is that the expert
arrived at his causation opinion by relying upon methods that
other experts in his field would reasonably rely on in forming
their own, possibly different opinions, about what caused the
210
patient's disease.
The court stated that in this case the expert, in expressing his "one-

hit" theory, had relied upon the "same kind of information relied
'211
upon by other medical experts.
VII.

HEARSAY

The common-law rules regarding the treatment of "hearsay" are
codified in Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 212 Although
the codified version arguably permits more hearsay evidence into a
trial, 2 3 the rules often remain the bane of counsel and judges alike.
Under rule 801, hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one
made by the declarant in court, which is offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. 214 Under the common law, evidence which
satisfied this test could not be offered for the truth of the matter
asserted unless it fell into one of many exceptions to the hearsay
rule. The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, converted a number
of those exceptions into exemptions from the rule; that is, they were
considered nonhearsay, not because they did not otherwise fall within
the common-law definition of hearsay, but because the drafters
determined that such evidence was reliable enough to be treated with
greater deference. 215 During the survey period, the Fifth Circuit
addressed several of these nonhearsay statements 2 6 and also addressed
the availability of the business records and residual hearsay excep21 7
tions.

210. Id. (quoting Osburn Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1987)
(emphasis in original, citations omitted)).
211. Id. at 1433-34.
212. See FED. R. EvrD. 801-806.
213. See generally S. SALTZBURGO & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL,
717 (4th ed. 1986)(noting that rule 801 did not include within the definition of hearsay the
common-law rule adopted in some jurisdictions that nonverbal conduct not intended to be
statement was hearsay).
214. FED. R. EvrD. 801(c).
215. See FED. R. Evm. 801 advisory committee's note.
216. Davis v. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E., Inc., 864 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. Feb.
1989); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 851 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. Aug. 1988); Staheli v.
University of Miss., 854 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988).
217. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Xanthas, Inc., 855 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988).
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A.

Hearsay: Party Admissions as Nonhearsay

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) defines admissions by a partyopponent as nonhearsay 2 8 and includes within that definition personal
admissions by a party 2 19 admissions by an agent of a party about
matters arising within the scope of the agency relationship 2 0 an
admission adopted by a party, 22 ' admissions made by a person
authorized to do so by a party 22 2 and finally, statements made by
co-conspirators. 2 3 If the offered statement falls within one of these
categories and is offered against the party 224 then it is, by definition,
nonhearsay and is admissible without regard to whether it also falls
22
within one of the many "exceptions" to the hearsay rule. ,
The issue of admissions by an agent was addressed in Staheli v.
University of Mississippi, 26 where a university professor brought
action against the university for denial of tenure. At trial, the
professor attempted to introduce the testimony of an accounting
professor who stated that tenure had been denied because the university's chancellor was vindictive.2 7 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the
trial court that this statement was not a nonhearsay admission by an
agent of a party-opponent under rule 801(d)(2)(D) .221 Noting that
there are few cases in the circuit on the issue, the court concluded
that the offered statement did not concern a matter within the scope
of the agency relationship. 229 The accounting professor had nothing
to do with the university's tenure decision or with any personnel
matter affecting the plaintiff.230 The court added that the accounting

218. See FED. R. EvD. 801(d)(2).
219. FED. R. EvrD. 801(d)(2)(A).
220. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(D).
221. FED. R. Evlu. 801(d)(2)(B).
222. FED. R. EvIo. 801(d)(2)(C).
223. FED. R. EVIr. 801(d)(2)(E).
224. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2).
225. For example, a statement by a party at the scene of an accident could be admissible
as an admission, if offered against the party, and also as an excited utterance under FED. R.
EvID. 803(2).
226. 854 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988).
227. Id. at 127.
228. Id.
229. Id. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(D). The rule requires more than simply an agency
relationship. The offered statement of the agent must have been made "concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship ....
Id.
230. 854 F.2d at 127.

TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:303

professor made the statement only in his "capacity as wisea-

cre

....

''1231

The admissibility of an agent's statement as nonhearsay was also
at issue in Davis v. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast,
Inc. 23 2 In that case an oil rig worker brought a negligence action
against Mobil after he slipped and fell on mud which had been
allowed to remain on the rig. 233 At trial the plaintiff, through three
witnesses, introduced evidence that at a safety meeting shortly before
the accident, an unidentified employee of Mobil ordered that the
accumulation of mud should not be washed from the floor of the
rig.2 3 4 The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the admission should
not have been admitted because the plaintiff had not been able to
identify by name the individual who gave the order. 235 In rejecting
that argument the Fifth Circuit noted that the plaintiff's witnesses
testified that there were three Mobil employees at the meeting and
that the older employeegave the order. 23 6 There was also testimony
that the person giving the order wore a Mobil hard hat. 2 7 The court
concluded by stating:
Persuaded that the . . . evidence is sufficient to allow the district
court to permit the testimony as an admission against Mobil, we
affirm the decision of the district court on this point. It should
not be understated, however, that while a name is not in all cases
required, a district court should be presented with sufficient
evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made
the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that
party for purposes of making an admission within the context of
23
Rule 801(d)(2)(D). 1

231. Id. The court noted that this result was similar to that reached by other circuits. See,
e.g., Hill v. Speigel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1983).
232. 864 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. Feb. 1989).
233. Id. at 1173.
234. Id. The order was given in an attempt to conserve water. Id.
235. Id. at 1173-74.
236. Id. at 1174.

237.

Id.

238. Id. The court cited O'Neal v. Esty, 637 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 972 (1981) where the court addressed the problem of determining which of the defendants
in a multi-defendant case made the admission. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stated that "justice might be better served and the Rules of Evidence more reasonably construed
by permitting a plaintiff to inform the jury that one of the defendants made an admission,
leaving to each defendant the burden of persuading the jury that the admission was not made
by him." 637 F.2d at 851.
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The issue of whether statements in an appellate brief could
constitute an admission by a party-opponent under rule 801(d)(2)(A)
was addressed in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.2 9 In a consolidated case, multiple plaintiffs argued that they had been injured
by asbestos products manufactured by the eight defendants. 240 At
trial, one of the plaintiffs introduced excerpts from appellate briefs
filed by two of the defendants in unrelated litigation. 24' The state-

ments, which regarded the effect of exposure to asbestos, were offered
242
as party admissions.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the statements in
24
the two appellate briefs were party admissions under rule 801(d)(2). 1
There is a difference, the court said, between statements made by a
party in trial court pleadings, which are normally admissible, 2" and
those made in .an appellate brief. 245 Statements in trial documents
normally constitute statements concerning the historical "real world"
facts of a case. 246 But appellate briefs are confined to statements
about the trial record.2 47 That distinction, the court stated, is crucial. 24 Because of %the difference in the nature of the documents,
there is a danger that statements in an appellate brief are "bound
to be uncertain in the best of circumstances and dangerously misleading in most others. ' 249 Thus, the trial court abused its discretion

239. 851 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. Aug. 1988).
240. Id. at 744.
241. Id. One of the statements was located in an appellate brief filed in a declaratory
judgment action in Illinois. The other had been filed in a federal declaratory judgment action
in the District of Columbia. In both instances, the briefs had been filed to establish insurance
coverage. Id.
At trial the defendants did not argue that the offered statements should only have been
admitted against the two defendants who had made them. The court noted that clearly the
statements could have been so limited but in the absence of an objection it considered the
statements to have been offered against all of the defendants. Id. at 745.
242. Id. at 745-46.
243. Id. at 746.
244. Id. at 745. The court noted that such trial pleadings might not be admissible in a
"complicated joinder situation, involving . . . the contingent liability of third parties...."
Id. at
1971)).
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

n.5 (citing Continental Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:303

in admitting the excerpts as admissions of a party opponent under

rule 801(d)(2) .250
Having determined that it was error to admit the statements,
the court analyzed the adverse impact of the statements on the
defendants and concluded that considering the prejudicial nature of
the excerpts and the "substantial potential to engender" jury confusion, the judgment should be reversed and remanded for a new
2s1
trial.
Of the foregoing "admissions" cases decided by the court, Hardy
is certainly the most remarkable. First, as the court recognized, there
are few, if any, cases in which counsel has attempted to introduce
appellate briefs from other cases as party admissions. 2 2 Second, aside
from the novelty of the evidentiary issue, the case is a rare example
25 3
of the court granting relief for an erroneous evidentiary ruling.
B.

Hearsay: The Business and Residual Hearsay Exceptions

Assuming that counsel offers a statement which satisfies the
definition of hearsay in rule 801(c) but does not fall within one of
the nonhearsay exemptions in rule 801(d), counsel may still find help
in a long list of hearsay exceptions. Two of those exceptions were
24
addressed by the court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Xanthas, Inc.
In Xanthas, a music society dedicated to protecting performance
rights brought a copyright infringement action against a juke box
operator. 255 In an attempt to prove that the juke box operator actually
owned the juke boxes in question, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of one of its counsel who read the responses of proprietors
who had answered a questionnaire prepared by the plaintiff. 25 6 The
trial court erred, said the Fifth Circuit, when it admitted this hearsay
testimony on the rationale that the hearsay rule does not apply to
bench trials. 25 7 According to the court, the letters from the proprietors

250. Id. at 746.
251. Id. at 747.
252. Id. at 745. The court indicated that it had found no cases involving the admissibility
of appellate briefs filed in different cases between different parties. Id.
253. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Xanthas,
Inc., 855 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988) (another Fifth Circuit evidentiary case where appellate
relief was granted).
254. 855 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988).
255. Id. at 235.
256. Id. at 237.
257. Id. at 238.

19901

EVIDENCE

were not admissible under the business records exception 258 or the
25
residual hearsay exception.

9

With regard to the business records exception, the plaintiff
argued that it "mailed out the questionnaires as a part of its 'regularly
conducted business activity.' ,,260 But there was nothing in the record,
said the court, which indicated that the responses from the proprietors
were made as a part of their business activity. 261 The court continued:
Even assuming the proprietors had filled out such forms regularly,
this would not show that they were kept "in the regular course
of business" under Rule 803(6), as the Supreme Court held in
Palmer v. Hoffman, construing the statutory predecessor of Rule
803(6). Like the accident reports the railroad in Palmercustomarily
produced, the forms were not completed by the proprietors as
part of the "systematic course" of their business; their primary
262
utility, rather, is for litigation.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the proprietors'
263
responses were admissible under the residual hearsay exception.
The plaintiff had argued that the responses were reliable and therefore
admissible because they had been completed by the proprietors in
compliance with section 116(a)(1)(B) of the Copyright Act. 26 Noting
2 65
that it had in the past accepted similar arguments of this form
the court indicated that the provisions of the Copyright Act do not
impose penalties for providing inaccurate information. 26 Thus, although the proprietors had an incentive to complete the forms, they
did not have "any incentive to fill out the questionnaires from [the
plaintiff] with precision or completeness.

'267

258. Id. See FED. R. EviD. 803(6).
259. 855 F.2d at 238-39. See FED. R. Evm. 803(24).
260. 855 F.2d at 238.
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)).
263. Id. See FED. R. Evr. 803(24) which provides in part:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
264. 855 F.2d at 238.
265. Id. at 239; see also id. n.16 (citing cases which have accepted this argument).
266. Id. at 239.
267. Id.
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Noting that the trial court had erroneously relied on this inadmissible hearsay 2 68 the court ultimately reversed and remanded the
case.2 69 Thus, this case, like Hardy, shares the distinction of being
one of the few evidence cases decided by the Fifth Circuit where an
270
evidentiary issue resulted in appellate relief.
VIII.

AUTHENTICATION

Before a proponent may introduce documents or physical evidence, he or she must be prepared to "authenticate" or "identify"
it.27
That is, a proponent must show that the offered evidence is
what it purports to be. 272 The methods of authentication are varied
and normally counsel will be able to find some way to meet the
requirement. Federal Rule of Evidence 901 sets out ten nonexhaustive
methods commonly relied upon to authenticate evidence. 273 Federal
Rule of Evidence 902 recognizes that some forms of evidence are
self,-authenticating because they inherently possess indicia of reliability.274

Both rule 901 and rule 902 were at issue in United States v.
Jimenez Lopez. 271 In that case the defendant was tried in the Western
District of Texas for illegally entering the United States after being
convicted of an earlier. similar entry. 276 To show the first offense,
the prosecution introduced a photostatic copy of a "Record of
Proceedings and Judgment" from the records of a United States
Magistrate in California. 277 The document showed that a person
having the same name as the defendant had been convicted under 8
U.S.C. section 1325.27 The clerk of the court had stamped the
document as "certified a true copy" and dated and signed it although

268. Id. at 238.
269. Id. at 240.
270. See supra notes 239-53 and accompanying text.
271. See FED. R. EviD. 901(a) which states: "General provision. The requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. See FED. R. Evm. 902 advisory committee's note.
275. 873 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. May 1989).
276. Id. at 770; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988) (the first commission of illegal entry is a
misdemeanor and any subsequent offense is a felony).
277. 873 F.2d at 771.
278. Id.; see supra note 276.
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the signature was illegible. 2 9 A border patrol agent testified that he
had personally requested the exhibit and had received it from an
agent in California who had in turn obtained it from the magistrate's,
court. 28 0 The defendant objected on the ground that the document

was not an Immigration and Naturalization Service document, and
therefore, it would not qualify under rule 901 or rule 902.281 The
defendant further objected on the ground that there -was no seal on
2
the document so that it was- not self-authenticating.

2

"Certifica-

' 23

The sole issue on
tion," said the defendant, "is not enough.
appeal was the admissibility of this prosecution exhibit. 28 4 According
to the court, government documents normally are self-authenticat901
ing. 2 5 But it measured the admissibility of the exhibit under rule
28 6
inapplicable.
was
902
rule
conceded-that
after the prosecution
The court noted that it "does not require conclusive proof of
authenticity before allowing the admission of disputed evidence.' '287
Instead, all that is required by rule 901 is that there be some evidence
which is sufficient to support the conclusion that the item is what
the proponent claims it is. 2a8 Noting that the illustrations in rule 901
are not exhaustive, the court concluded that the document was
admissible. 28 9 First, the document on its face appeared to be the
record of a conviction. 290 Second, even though it was not under seal,
it was certified by the clerk of a court. 291 And third, the agent's
testimony concerning the chain of custody of the document in conjunction with "the internal indicia of reliability within the document"
justified its admission.

292

279. 873 F.2d at 771.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. The concession was apparently based upon the fact that the exhibit was not under
seal and no public officer had certified under seal that the document was genuine. Id. See
FED. R. EvrD. 902(1), (2).
287. 873 F.2d at 772.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 772, 774.
290. Id. at 772.
291. Id.
292. Id. The court recognized that without the testimony of the agent, "the admissibility
of the document would have been doubtful." Id.
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The defendant argued that the court should follow the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Perlmuter.293 In Perlmuter, the
prosecution had presented a document purportedly reflecting the
defendant's criminal record in Israel. 294 The trial court ruled that the
authentication certificate attached to the document was invalid but
that the document itself had an "aura of authenticity." 29 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that normally the Federal Rules of Evidence offer
"generous opportunity" to authenticate evidence by extrinsic evidence
or by means of self-authentication under rule 902.29 But it rejected
the argument that an appearance of authenticity would be suffi297
cient.
Noting that the Ninth Circuit "appears to require exceedingly
strict compliance with the authenticity rules," the Fifth Circuit distinguished Perlmuter on three grounds. 298 First, the document in
Perlmuter was a record of convictions provided by Interpol which is
not a United States agency. 299 Second, the records in Perlmuter
involved foreign judicial proceedings. 3°° And third, defense counsel
in Perlmuter also raised hearsay objections to the offered documents.3 0 1 The Fifth Circuit noted that there were hearsay elements in
the authenticating testimony of the agent in this case, but that no
hearsay objections had been made and that the issue had therefore
not been preserved for appeal. 0 2
The court's disposition of the authentication issue in Jimenez
Lopez makes eminent sense. As the court noted, conclusive proof of
authenticity should not be required.3 °3 The stated threshold in rule
901 is relatively low and can be met by offering circumstantial
evidence, as was done in this case.? 4

293. 693 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1982).
294. Id. at 1292.
295. Id.at 1292-93.
296. Id. at 1293.
297. Id.
298. 873 F.2d at 773.
299. Id. In Perlmuter, the Ninth Circuit had indicated that "the record of convictions for
the purposes of a court must come from a court itself in order to be considered reliable."
693 F.2d at 1295.
300. 873 F.2d at 773.
301. Id.
302. Id. See FED. R. Evm. 103(a)(1).
303. 873 F.2d at 772.
304. See also FED. R. EvrD. 901(b)(4) which provides: "(4) Distinctive characteristics and
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CONCLUSION

Although most of the foregoing cases are not remarkable, several
points are worth emphasizing. First, the court has continued its trend
of careful and prudent analysis of evidentiary issues. Second, the
court has addressed several evidentiary issues that do not arise often.
For example, in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,305 it considered
the issue of whether a party's statements in an appellate brief could
constitute party admissions under the hearsay rules.3°6 It also considered the "mental processes" rule, an issue one rarely sees, in Gary
W. v. Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources.0 7
But just as noteworthy is the fact that the court in United States
v. Jimenez Lopez3"0 addressed only one issue on appeal - the
question of whether a government document was adequately authenticated. 3°9 That fact alone distinguishes the case because one usually
sees the evidentiary issues buried amidst other, more esoteric procedural matters.
Throughout all of the cases, one message should be clear:
Regardless of whether the issue is novel or esoteric, if counsel has
any hopes of obtaining appellate relief on an evidentiary issue, it is
essential that the issue be presented concisely and completely to the
trial court.

the like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics,
taken in conjunction with the circumstances."
Although the court did not cite this provision, it seems that it would have provided ample
support for the court's conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 532 F.2d 641, 644 (8th
Cir. 1976) (notebooks authenticated by using distinctive characteristics).
305. 851 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. Aug. 1988).
306. Id. at 744.
307. 861 F.2d 1366, 1368 (5th Cir. Dec. 1988).
308. 873 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. May 1989).
309. Id. at 770.

